employee's performance was poor. The justification assures the employee that the manager has not distorted the evaluation …? Suppose a manager's evaluation is private information. Justifying her evaluation is costly but limits the principal's scope … for distorting her evaluation of the employee. I show that the manager justifies her evaluation if and only if the …

evaluation to the agent if the evaluation turns out to be bad. The justification assures the agent that the principal has not … her evaluation. For good performance, however, the principal pays a constant high wage without justification. Furthermore …Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? In this paper the principal's evaluation is private …

explain her evaluation to the agent if and only if the evaluation turns out to be bad. The justification guarantees the agent …Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? In this paper the principal's evaluation is private … that the principal has not distorted the evaluation downwards. On the equilibrium path, as long as the principal provides a …

employee’s performance was poor. The justification assures the employee that the manager has not distorted the evaluation …? Suppose a manager’s evaluation is private information. Justifying her evaluation is costly but limits the principal’s scope … for distorting her evaluation of the employee. I show that the manager justifies her evaluation if and only if the …

employee’s performance was poor. The justification assures the employee that the manager has not distorted the evaluation …? Suppose a manager’s evaluation is private information. Justifying her evaluation is costly but limits the principal’s scope … for distorting her evaluation of the employee. I show that the manager justifies her evaluation if and only if the …

Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? Suppose the principal's evaluation is private information, but … is restricted, but the message is costless. I show that the principal justies her evaluation to the agent if the … evaluation indicates bad performance. The justication assures the agent that the principal has not distorted the evaluation …

discrete bonuses after they do sufficiently well. By adjusting monitoring intensity and communication of performance, the …

commitment. By allowing the principal to use general communication devices we overcome the literature's common, but overly … restrictive focus on one-shot, direct communication. In addition, general communication devices solve two fundamental problems of … the message spaces of the communication device. An example illustrates our arguments and the suboptimality of one …