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Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility
Myerson, Roger B. - 1994
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001327648
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Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication
Gerardi, Dino; Myerson, Roger B. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2005
We study the effects of communication in Bayesian games when the players are sequentially rational but some combinations of types have zero probability. Not all communication equilibria can be implemented as sequential equilibria. We define the set of strong sequential equilibria (SSCE) and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762852
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Multistage games with communication
Myerson, Roger B. - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 54 (1986) 2, pp. 323-358
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001008092
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Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication
Gerardi, Dino (contributor); Myerson, Roger B. (contributor) - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003468426
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Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication
Gerardi, Dino; Myerson, Roger B. - In: Games and economic behavior 60 (2007) 1, pp. 104-134
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003496542
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Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication
Gerardi, Dino - 2005
We study the effects of communication in Bayesian games when the players are sequentially rational but some combinations of types have zero probability. Not all communication equilibria can be implemented as sequential equilibria. We define the set of strong sequential equilibria (SSCE) and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012784067