We investigate how an informed designer maximizes her objective when facinga player whose payoff depends on both the designer's private information andon an unknown state within the classical quasilinear environment. Thedesigner can disclose arbitrary information about the state via...

The consumers’ life environment has become more and more invaded by advertising communications. The considerable investments in advertising and publicity activities must be identified in the positive modifications of consumers’ behaviours, under cognitive, affective and conative aspect. The...

The cost incurred by the sender of an e-mail does not reflect the costs to the recipient, leading to a larger number of messages being sent than is optimal for the general welfare. As a solution, we suggest a per-message e-mail tax on the sender similar to that proposed by Shiman (1996), with...

Beckmann;s interaction model has each resident touching base in face-to-face activity with every other resident, per unit time, at the other's residence. We re-work his resulting "interaction city" with each resident "operating with" a Cobb-Douglas utility function. We then turn to a more...

Although both cognitive and motivational factors can influence the communication of uncertain information, most of the work investigating the communication of uncertainty has focused on cognitive factors. In this article, we demonstrate that motivational factors influence the communication of...

I study a multi-sender signaling game between an uninformed decision maker and two senders with common private information and conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that is tied to the size of the misrepresentation. The main results concern the amount of information...

Organizations design their communication structures to improve decision-making while limiting wasteful influence activities. An efficient communication protocol grants complete information payoffs to all organization members, thereby overcoming asymmetric information problems at no cost. This...

I consider a seller selling a good to bidders with two-dimensional private information: their valuation for a good and their characteristic. While valuations are non-verifiable, characteristics are partially verifiable and convey information about the distribution of a bidder's valuation. I...

This paper analyzes truthtelling incentives in pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees. We generalize the classical Condorcet jury model by introducing a new informational structure that captures consistency of information. In contrast to the impossibility result shown by Coughlan...

The paper studies the role of communication in facilitating collusion. The situation of infinitely repeated Cournot competition in the presence of antitrust enforcement is considered. Firms observe only their own production levels and a common market price. The price is assumed to have a...