Showing 1 - 10 of 13,133
This paper studies whether dissemination of private, pre-decision signals about productivity is valuable to the principal when agents work sequentially and observe each other’s effort. The benefit of dissemination is that when productivity states are correlated, each agent’s signal is useful...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014042884
We develop a model of information exchange through communication and investigate its implications for information … to form a costly \textit{communication link} with, incurring the associated cost. After receiving a \textit …{private signal} correlated with the underlying state, they exchange information over the induced \textit{communication network} until …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011684965
other hand the decision makers rely too much on the received information. Moreover, communication as well as payoffs … communication is less biased. In all treatments, however, the messages are more precise than theoretically predicted. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260085
When groups face difficult problems, the voices of experts may be lost in the noise of others' contributions. We present results from a "naturally noisy" setting, a large first-year undergraduate class, in which the expert's voice was "lost" to such a degree that bringing forward even more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432144
) equilibrium. Fully informative myopic and farsighted equilibria essentially take a particular simple form: all communication is … and analyze equilibrium welfare. Furthermore, we extend our model to public communication and investigate the implications …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020319
Consider a group of individuals with unobservable perspectives (subjective prior beliefs) about a sequence of states. In each period, each individual receives private information about the current state and forms an opinion (a posterior belief). She also chooses a target individual and observes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013007190
of the bias parameter is common knowledge, communication between the players may exhibit misinterpretation (i.e., the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006475
This paper analyzes strategic information transmission between a sender and a receiver with similar objectives. We provide a first-order approximation of the equilibrium behavior in the general version of the Crawford and Sobel's (1982) model with a small bias. Our analysis goes beyond the usual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013163024
This paper provides a complete first-order characterization of equilibrium behavior in the general version of the Crawford and Sobel (1982)'s model when the conflict of interest is small. This exercise allows us to deepen our understanding of how a state-dependent bias and a non-uniform...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012893298
communication games do not yield equilibria which (ex ante) outperform delegation. Referring to multiple experts allow the decision …-maker to obtain more information. However, this information can never be perfect, and sophisticated communication games, for … instance with multilateral, multistage communication, do not outperform simple communication methods …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146150