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Belief-free communication equilibria in repeated games
Tomala, Tristan - In: Mathematics of operations research 38 (2013) 4, pp. 617-637
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010210766
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Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
Tomala, Tristan - In: Games and economic behavior 67 (2009) 2, pp. 682-694
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10003909315
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Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
Renault, Jérôme; Tomala, Tristan - In: Games and economic behavior 49 (2004) 2, pp. 313-344
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10002396383
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Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan - 2010
This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014213825
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Mechanism design and communication networks
Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan - 2010
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10003953006
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Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
Heller, Yuval; Solan, Eilon; Tomala, Tristan - In: Games and economic behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 222-234
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10009511279
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Mechanism design and communication networks
Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 7 (2012) 3, pp. 489-533
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10009663611
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Secure message transmission on directed networks
Renault, Jérôme; Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan - In: Games and economic behavior 85 (2014), pp. 1-18
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010489258
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Mechanism design and communication networks
Renou, Ludovic (contributor); Tomala, Tristan (contributor) - 2008
This paper characterizes the class of communication networks for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive-compatible social choice function is (partially) implementable. Among others, in environments with either common and independent beliefs and private values or a bad...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10003795217
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Mechanism design and communication networks
Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 3, pp. 489-533
This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is partially...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011689312