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Executive compensation as an agency problem

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Fried, Jesse M. - In: The economic nature of the firm : a reader, (pp. 327-345). 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003918376

Executive compensation in America : optimal contracting or extraction of rents?

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Fried, Jesse M.; Walker, David I. - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001628673

Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Fried, Jesse M.; Walker, David I. - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001685998

Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Fried, Jesse M.; Walker, David I. - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001674423

Executive compensation in America : optimal contracting or extraction of rents?

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Fried, Jesse M.; Walker, David I. - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001632911

Executive Compensation in America : Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents?

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2010

This paper develops an account of the role and significance of rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting view of executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763080