We examine whether board and ownership structure variables explain the level of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. After controlling for standard economic determinants (i.e., the firm's demand for a high-quality CEO, firm performance, and risk), we find that board and ownership...

The two major paradigmsin the theoretical agency literature aremoral hazard (i.e., hidden action)and adverseselection (i.e., hiddeninformation). Prior research typically solves these problemsin isolation, as opposed to simultaneouslyincorporating both adverseselection and moral hazard features....

Executive compensation has become one of the most contentious topics in corporate governance. However, public perception about executive pay suffers from many misconceptions. These include the notions that:1. The ratio of CEO-to-average-worker pay is a useful statistic:2. Compensation...

In Closer Look, we highlight significant “holes” in our knowledge of corporate governance. These are central issues where insufficient or inadequate study has left us unable to answer basic questions, and where key assumptions relied upon by experts have not been verified or validated. While...

Recent years have seen a reemergence of the practice of awarding “mega grants” to CEOs. Mega grants are large, one-time equity awards granted in lieu of or in addition to annual awards with the intended purpose of providing significant incentive to the CEO to achieve long-term targets. The...