Bidders have to decide whether and when to incur the cost of estimating their own values in auctions. This can explain sniping - flurries of bids late in auctions with deadlines - as the result of bidders trying to avoid stimulating other bidders into examining their bid ceiling more carefully

In this paper, we analyse a multistage game of competition among auctioneers. In a first stage, auctioneers commit to some publicly announced reserve prices, and in a second stage, bidders choose to participate in one of the auctions. We prove existence of Nash equilibria in mixed strategies for...

We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are:(i) Bidders have an incentive to participate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly...

This paper empirically investigates the effect of the competitive environment (number of participants) on the cost of procurement. We use a unique dataset provided by the Public Procurement Authority (PPA) of Turkey that covers all of the government procurement auctions for the years...

We study a model of conflicts and wars in which the outcome is uncertain not because of luck on the battlefield as in standard models, but because countries lack information about their opponent. In this model expected resource levels and production and military technologies are common...

Brazil, Chile and other developing countries have recently experienced with forward or long-run contract auctions for electricity demand, to meet supply adequacy problems. In this paper, we analyze what it requires to have a competitive auction process for this type of contracts when each bidder...

The answer is no. Although naive intuition may suggest the opposite, uncertainty about costs in the homogeneous-good Bertrand model intensifies competition: it lowers price and raises total surplus (but also makes profits go up). For some economic environments, this is implied by Hansen's (RAND,...

This paper shows that ignoring differences in developers' competitive strength and their bidding behavior in land auctions leads to distorted valuation of urban lands. Using the government's land sale data in Singapore for the sample periods 1990-2011, we found that after controlling for...

Using online auction data, we address the endogeneity involved in estimating the eff ect of the number of bidders on the winning bid. We introduce a novel instrumental variable. Our results indicate that the bias arising from treating the number of bidders as exogenous, is substantial

If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities into the all-pay auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a large share in the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. As a...