Showing 1 - 9 of 9
This paper analyzes incumbency contests in a large population setting. Incumbents repeatedly face different challengers, holding on to their positions until defeated in a contest. Defeated incumbents turn into challengers until they win a contest against an incumbent, thereby regaining an...
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In contest models with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, these shares sum to less than one because a share of the value is lost due to rent-dissipation. We ask: can every such division into payoff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010499802
Extreme adverse selection arises when private information has unbounded support, and market breakdown occurs when no trade is the only equilibrium outcome. We study extreme adverse selection via the limit behavior of a financial market as the support of private information converges to an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003461269
This paper analyzes iterated incumbency contests with heterogeneous valuations in a large population setting. Incumbents repeatedly face different challengers, holding on to their positions until defeated in a contest. Defeated incumbents turn into challengers until they win a contest against an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011569559
In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, players’ shares sum to less than one because a residual share of the value is lost due to rent dissipation. In this paper,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550537
In this paper we consider the problem of regulating an open access essential facility. A vertically integrated firm owns an essential input and operates on the downstream market under the roof of a regulatory mechanism. There is a potential entrant in the downstream market. Both competitors use...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968359
We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players. At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the players. At stage two, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneously invest in a winner-take-all competition The game is solved theoretically and then tested by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968442
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