Policy makers are increasingly concerned about the combination of market power and massive data collection in digital markets. This concern is fueled by the theoretical prediction that more market power causes firms to collect ever more data from their users. We investigate the relationship...

Despite the prevalence of both competitive forces and patterns of collaboration within academic communities, studies on research productivity generally treat universities as independent entities. By exploring the research productivity of all academic economists employed at 81 universities and 17...

We analyze the endogenous formation of R&D networks, where firms are active in different product markets and can benefit from R&D spillovers form collaborating firms within or across different industries. R&D spillovers help firms to introduce process innovations to lower their production costs....

I develop a model of collaboration between tournament participants in which agents collaborate in pairs, and an endogenous structure of collaboration is represented by a weighted network. The agents are forward-looking and capable of coordination; they value collaboration with others and higher...

Policy makers are increasingly concerned about the combination of market power and massive data collection in digital markets. This concern is fueled by the theoretical prediction that more market power causes firms to collect ever more data from their users. We investigate the relationship...

In models of political economy, institutionalization of free and open elections is presented as infusing competition into a previously monopolized regime. Due to elections, representative democracies are thought to reflect the will of the majority as opposed to the will of the elites. I...

Current merger review law is critically flawed. Courts in Clayton Act Section 7 cases consider the likelihood that a merger will harm competition as a threshold question before considering the size of harm that could ensue. Under current law, to block a merger a judge must find that the deal is...

We develop a model of contests on networks. Each player is “connected” to a set of contests and exerts a single effort to increase the probability of winning each contest to which she is connected. We characterize equilibria under the Tullock contest success function and explore how behavior...

We study competitive behavior in all-pay Tullock (1980) contests with identity-dependent externalities (IDEs) governed by a fixed network. First, we introduce a model of network contest games, in which the prize generates an externality---which may be positive or negative---that impacts each...