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An auction is viewed as a process that in equilibrium generates a binary lottery for each bidder, which the bidder "buys" with his bid. This view allows for a simple way to consistently assess differences in bidding behavior over different bidders and different auctions. E.g. all auctions...
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We define an indirect evolutionary approach formally and apply it to (Tullock)contests. While it is known (Leininger, 2003) that the direct evolutionary approach in the form of finite population ESS (Schaffer, 1988) yields more aggressive behavior than in Nash equilibrium, it is now shown that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003728964
An auction is viewed as a process that in equilibrium generates a binary lottery for each bidder, which the bidder buys with his bid. This view allows for a simple way to consistently assess differences in bidding behavior over different bidders and different auctions. E.g. all auctions covered...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781657
Motivationen treiben Entscheidungen an. Doch welche Ziele werden im Kontext ökonomischer Entscheidungen verfolgt? Sowohl die 'Realität' als auch die experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung zeichnen ein widersprüchliches Bild. 'Fairneß' beeinflußt Verhandlungsergebnisse, 'Reziprozität' hilft...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013345577
This paper provides existence and characterization of the optimal contest success function under the condition that the objective of the contest designer is total effort maximization among n heterogeneous players. Heterogeneity of players makes active participation of a player in equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014202462
This paper provides existence and characterization of the optimal contest success function under the condition that the objective of the contest designer is total effort maximization among n heterogeneous players. Heterogeneity of players makes active participation of a player in equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013157192
We allow a contest organizer to bias a contest in a discriminatory way, that is, she can favor specific contestants through the choice of contest success functions in order to maximize total equilibrium effort (resp. revenue). The scope for revenue enhancement through biasing is analyzed and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013110531
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