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Intra-Group Heterogeneity in Collective Contests

Nitzan, Shmuel - 2013

Collective contests are examined permitting heterogeneity of stakes within every competing group. Our first concern is whether unequal distribution of stakes in a group can enhance its win probability. Our second concern is whether a large stake in a group can be individually disadvantageous. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013086980

Intra-group heterogeneity in collective contests

Nitsan, Shemuʾel; Ueda, Kaoru - 2013

marginal effort costs ; unequal stakes and group performance ; military alliance ; "exploitation of the large" …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009700302

Lotteries vs. all-pay auctions in fair and biased contests

Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - 2011

The form of contests for a single fixed prize can be determined by a designer who maximizes the contestants' efforts. This paper establishes that, under common knowledge of the two asymmetric contestants' prize valuations, a fair Tullock-type endogenously determined lottery is always superior to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010253177

Lotteries vs. All-Pay Auctions in Fair and Biased Contests

Epstein, Gil S. - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013096475

Direct and structural discrimination in contests

Mealem, Yosef; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - 2013

This paper evaluates direct and structural discrimination as a means of increasing efforts in the most widely studied contests. We establish that a designer who maximizes efforts subject to a balanced-budget constraint prefers dual discrimination, namely, change of the contestants ́prize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010223058

Prize Sharing Rules in Collective Contests : Towards Strategic Foundations

Gupta, Dhritiman - 2020

In this paper we deal with situations of collective contests between two groups over a private prize. A well known way to divide the prize within the winning group is the prize sharing rule introduced by Nitzan, 1991. Since its introduction it has become a standard in the collective contests...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012829843

Coopetition in group contest

Kiss, Hubert J.; Rosa-Garcia, Alfonso; Zhukova, Vita - 2019

There are situations in which competitors ally to pursue a common objective. This simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition is called coopetition and we study it theoretically and experimentally in a group contest setup. More concretely, we analyze a group contest with a new sharing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012016453

Coopetition in Group Contest

Kiss, Hubert Janos - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012871693

Adding Tournament to Tournament : Combining Between-Team and Within-Team Incentives

Majerczyk, Michael - 2018

We examine theoretically and experimentally how combining between-team and within-team incentives affects behavior in … team tournaments. Theory predicts that free-riding is likely to occur when there are only between-team incentives, and … offering within-team incentives may solve this problem. However, if individuals collude, then within-team incentives may not be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012921253

The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests

Schweinzer, Paul; Segev, Ella - 2008

We show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n-player Tullock tournaments assigns the entire prize pool to the winner, provided that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists. If such an equilibrium fails to exist under the winner-take-all structure, we construct the optimal prize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343930