which the player expending the greater resources wins. In equilibrium, contest effort concentrates on at most two adjacent … by which the allocation of prizes are governed by possibly repeated conflict. Our results contribute to an explanation … why. Compared to a single stage conflict, such structures can reduce the overall resources that are dissipated among the …

We investigate a multi-period contest model in which a contestant.s present success gives an advantage over a rival in …

While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based on the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive noise … the equilibrium set of the n-player difference-form contest with heterogeneous valuations. For high and intermediate … valuations, we obtain a partial uniqueness result for symmetric equilibria. As the contest becomes increasingly decisive, at …

We characterize the equilibrium set of the n-player Hirshleifer contest with homogeneous valuations. A symmetric … in cut-throat competition, while any others become ultimately inactive. Of some conceptual interest is the observation …

While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based upon the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive … the equilibrium set of the n-player difference-form contest with heterogeneous valuations. For high or intermediate levels … valuations, we obtain a partial uniqueness result for symmetric equilibria. As the contest becomes increasingly decisive, at …

We use a Tullock-type contest to show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically … original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest …

, holding on to their positions until defeated in a contest. Defeated incumbents turn into challengers until they win a contest …

We consider contestants who must choose exactly one contest, out of several, to participate in. We show that when the … contest technology is of a certain type, or when the number of contestants is large, a self-allocation equilibrium, i.e., one … where no contestant would wish to change his choice of contest, results in the allocation of players to contests that …

We use a Tullock-type contest model to show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically … and revenue equivalent to each other. We consider a two-player contest, where outcome-contingent payoffs are linear … may yield different equilibrium payoffs. Finally, we discuss possible contest design applications and avenues for future …