If an intermediary offers sellers a platform to reach consumers, he may face a hold-up problem: sellers suspect that the intermediary will enter their respective market, competing with them. As sellers fear that they cannot recoup their sunk costs of entry, they do not join the platform. Hence,...

If an intermediary offers sellers a platform to reach consumers, he may face the following hold-up problem: sellers suspect the intermediary will enter their respective product market as a merchant after they have sunk fixed costs of entry. Therefore, fearing that their investments cannot be...

This paper deals with trade platforms whose operators not only allow third party sellers to offer their products to consumers, but also offer products themselves. In this context, the platform operator faces a hold-up problem if he uses classical twopart tariffs only as potential competition...

We experimentally investigate a Bertrand market with homogenous goods where sellers may behave socially responsible by donating a share of their profits to an existing non-profit organization. In our experiment, we find that this Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) component is used...

Recent empirical studies suggest a need for a ?exible patent regime responding to industry characteristics. In practice, sector-speci?c modi?cations of patent strength already exist but lack theoretical foundation. This paper intends to make up for this neglect by scrutinizing in what direction...

If duopolistic firms can choose their strategy variable, uncertainty about demand conditions and the degree of substitutability have countervailing effects on variable choice. High uncertainty favors prices, while close substitutability favors quantities. For intermediate values, a hybrid...