A monopolistic information provider sells an informative experiment to a large number of perfectly competitive firms. Within each firm, a principal contracts with an exclusive agent who is privately informed about his production cost. Principals decide whether to acquire the experiment, that is...

We analyze the production of electricity from n power stations situated along a river in a dynamic model. Each power station's production of electricity is constrained by the quantity of water available to it (capacity constraint) as well as limitations of reservoir capacity (storage...

This paper develops a framework to analyze how choices are made when R&D competition occurs between two firms, and the aggressiveness-time tradeoffs have to be resolved in multiple stages. At issue is the way in which resources are used at each stage, i.e. are aggressiveness problems undertaken...

We consider a firm moving towards a stochastic final destination, to be chosen from a discrete set after a decision period. The decision period itself may be deterministic or stochastic. We assume the firm can move at variable innovation (R&D) speed associated with a monotone nondecreasing...

This paper considers a model with two competing supply chains where production costs are private information within a supply chain, but manufacturers can decide to share this information with the rival manufacturer. In contrast to existing literature, we study bottom-up negotiations, where...

This paper characterizes the degree of price discretion that competing organizations (principals) award to their sales managers (agents) and examines how such discretion is affected by principals' competitive conduct, market concentration, product substitutability, and demand volatility. We lay...