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Matros, Alexander - 2018

We develop a model of contests on networks. Each player is “connected” to a set of contests and exerts a single effort … many well-known results from the contest literature can be obtained by varying the structure of the network. Our framework …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012919103

Contests with Network Externalities : Theory & Evidence

Boosey, Luke; Brown, Christopher - 2021

by a fixed network. First, we introduce a model of network contest games, in which the prize generates an externality …---which may be positive or negative---that impacts each player directly connected by the network to the winner of the contest. We … for games played on networks. We then derive closed-form results, with an intuitive characterization, for regular networks …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013218632

Optimal Information Disclosure in Competing Contests with Capacity Constrained Players

Antsygina, Anastasia - 2021

This paper studies optimal information disclosure in competing contests with identical players. Each player faces a capacity constraint on the total effort contribution and is ex ante uninformed about the difficulty of the task to be performed in one of the contests. The task can be either...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212097

Communication and Commitment in Contests

Fu, Qiang - 2011

Players often engage in high-profile public communications to demonstrate their confidence of winning before they carry out actual competitive activities. This paper investigates players' incentives to conduct such pre-contest communication. We assume that a player suffers a cost when he sends a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013119001

Diversification and Information in Contests

Lemus, Jorge A. - 2019

We study information disclosure and diversification in contests with technological uncertainty, where agents can pursue different technologies to compete in the contest, but there is uncertainty regarding which will be implemented ex post. The principal can credibly reveal some information about...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012872186

The n-player Hirshleifer contest

Ewerhart, Christian; Sun, Guang-Zhen - 2023 - Revised version, October 2023

While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based on the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive noise such as considered by Hirshleifer (1989) may be equally plausible depending on the application. In this paper, we examine the equilibrium set of the n-player difference-form...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014380413

Elastic contests and the robustness of the all-pay auction

Ewerhart, Christian - 2014 - Revised version: May 5, 2014

This paper studies a large class of imperfectly discriminating contests, referred to as elastic contests, that induce players to either overbid a standing bid or to abstain from bidding altogether. Many common forms of contest are elastic. In any equilibrium of an elastic contest, there is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360312

Payoff shares in two-player contests

Häfner, Samuel; Nöldeke, Georg - 2014

In contest models with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, these shares sum to less than one because a share of the value is lost due to rent-dissipation. We ask: can every such division into payoff...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010499802

Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction

Ewerhart, Christian - 2016 - Revised version

This paper considers all-pay contests in which the relationship between bids and allocation reflects a small amount of noise. Prior work had focused on one particular equilibrium. However, there may be other equilibria. To address this issue, we introduce a new and intuitive measure for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538607

Sorting in iterated incumbency contests

Häfner, Samuel; Nöldeke, Georg - 2016

This paper analyzes iterated incumbency contests with heterogeneous valuations in a large population setting. Incumbents repeatedly face different challengers, holding on to their positions until defeated in a contest. Defeated incumbents turn into challengers until they win a contest against an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011569559