There is an active global debate on corporate governance. A few years ago, there was serious concern about whether US companies would be able to compete against the powerful corporate groupings supported by closely involved banks in the Far East. Now, following the collapse of the East Asian...

The paper examines interrelations between corporate governance, competition and performance. Traditional theories emphasise the importance of managerial incentives and disciplining in corporate governance, and how institutional arrangements affect financing. The paper argues that ownership and...

When firms compete in the managerial labor market, the choice of corporate governance by a firm affects, and is affected by, the choice of governance by other firms. Firms with weaker governance offer managers more generous incentive compensation, which induces firms with good governance to also...

We present a model in which managers are risk-averse and firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha"). When managers are not mobile across firms, firms provide efficient compensation, which allows for learning about managerial talent and for insurance of low-quality managers. When...

We propose a model in which firms use corporate governance as part of an optimal compensation scheme: better governance incentivizes managers to perform better and thus saves on the cost of providing pay for performance. However, when managerial talent is scarce, firms compete to attract better...