We consider two-sided markets in which consumers and firms endogenously determine whether they single-home (patronize only one platform), or multi-home (join competing platforms). We find that the standard competitive bottleneck allocation in which all consumers single-home and all firms...

We develop a model for two-sided markets with consumers and producers, who interact through a platform. Typical settings for the model are the market for smartphones with phone users, app producers, and smartphone operating systems; or the video game market with game players, video game...

Firms in traditional markets often compete in output à la Cournot. In this paper, we consider Cournot competition between platforms in a two-sided market. We find that the markup and markdown terms are distorted toward zero for greater levels of platform competition and for greater levels of...

This paper considers intra-platform technologies that allow a consumer's content and preferences to carryover across platform generations. In many platform industries content consumed on a platform's previous generation can be used on the platform's new generation. Naturally, a consumer with...