We study joint marketing arrangements by competing firms who engage in price discrimination between consumers who patronize only one firm (single purchasing) and those who purchase from both competitors (bundle purchasers). Two types of joint marketing are considered. Firms either commit to a...

We study joint marketing arrangements by competing firms who engage in price discrimination between consumers who patronize only one firm (single purchasing) and those who purchase from both competitors (bundle purchasers). Two types of joint marketing are considered. Firms either commit to a...

We develop a model for two-sided markets with consumers and producers, who interact through a platform. Typical settings for the model are the market for smartphones with phone users, app producers, and smartphone operating systems; or the video game market with game players, video game...

Production runs suffer from inadvertent quality variation. There are good apples; there are bad apples (also known as “seconds”). The Alchian-Allen theorem states that a common per-unit charge on two goods differentiated only by quality, increases the relative export demand for the higher...

We consider two-sided markets in which consumers and firms endogenously determine whether they single-home (patronize only one platform), or multi-home (join competing platforms). We find that the standard competitive bottleneck allocation in which all consumers single-home and all firms...