Building on dynamic collusion theories, we predict that firms with less concentrated upstream or downstream industries have lower systematic risk because their supply chain partners tend to compete more aggressively during recessions, absorbing more of the adverse effect of aggregate shocks....

We examine whether and how firms structure their merger and acquisition (M&A) deals to avoid scrutiny from antitrust regulators. There are approximately 40% more M&As than expected bunching just below thresholds that trigger antitrust review. These “stealth acquisitions” tend to involve...

This study examines how private communication among competitors shapes their public disclosures. Theories at the intersection of accounting and industrial organization suggest that competing firms can use public disclosure to coordinate, and predict a substitutive relation between private...

Transparency of quality in the healthcare sector primarily aims to facilitate patients' care decisions, however, it also provides useful information to competing healthcare providers. We study how competitors respond to increased transparency about rivals' quality by exploiting a regulatory...