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Government policy is more effective when the enforcement regime is transparent, because the economy benefits from the resulting reduction in transactions costs. The Federal Trade Commission has promoted transparency through a number of formal and informal programs. Examples include detailed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013108691
This paper empirically analyzes the Federal Trade Commission's merger enforcement decisions, to supplement the 2004 release of the Horizontal Merger Investigation Data. The study provides insights into the review process for both multi- and single-market mergers. We present concentration-based...
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Purpose Plus Factors have long played an important role in inferring a price agreement from the totality of the evidence. In response to changes in the case law, economists have proposed two alternative paths for the future of price fixing analysis. This paper evaluates the suggested approaches...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015367772
This paper explores the use of collusion theories in merger analysis at the Federal Trade Commission. The 1992 Merger Guidelines focuses on unilateral effect, relegating collusion analysis to a second tier theory. Both structural and behavioral conditions conducive to establishing or maintaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222696
Most mergers filed at the enforcement agencies are conglomerate in nature with only minor horizontal overlaps. An enforcement agency may challenge the merger, if any overlap is believed to be adversely affected by the transaction. While the merging firm is entitled to a hearing in federal court,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222986
Most mergers involve multiple markets. The potential for settlement can vary by the fraction of the overall deal attributable to the markets of concern. (i.e., by the “overlap”). If an antitrust agency challenges a merger having only a small overlap, negotiating a settlement is very likely;...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014126330
In this study, merger enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission is shown to be affected by structural variables (the Herfindahl, the change in the Herfindahl, and the number of significant rivals), an entry index, and three evidence variables (hot documents, validated customer complaints, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014061592