Using French and Raven's (1959) bases of social power, leadership is defined in terms of a dependency between leader and follower. The authors show how referrent and expert power are critical to the ascientific construct of leadership in predicting the extent to which trust can be created within...

We report the results of trust dilemmas that are modeled as non-cooperative n-person games evolving over time. As long as all the n players continue cooperating, their potential payoff increases exponentially over time. Simultaneously, the temptation to defect increases too, as the player who is...

Disagreements between psychologists and economists about the need for and size of financial incentives continue to be hotly discussed. We examine the effects of financial incentives in a class of interactive decision making situations, called centipede games, in which mutual trust is essential...

We study a class of trust dilemmas with symmetric players that evolve in real-time. In these games, as long as all the n players continue to cooperate, the payoff function increases exponentially over time. Simultaneously, however, the temptation to defect also increases at the same rate. The...

We study a class of trust dilemmas with symmetric players that evolve in real-time. In these games, as long as all the n players continue to cooperate, the payoff function increases exponentially over time. Simultaneously, however, the temptation to defect also increases at the same rate. The...