In this paper we study a two period contest where the strength of players in the second period depends on the result of the contest in the first stage. We show that in contrast to one-shot contests in the same setting, heterogeneous players exert different efforts in the first stage and rent...

In this paper we study a two stage contest where the strength of players in the second stage depends on the result of the contest in the first stage. We show that this contest displays properties that are not present in one shot contests. Non-symmetric players make different efforts in the first...

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are...

In this paper we examine the link between ethnic and religious polariza- tion and conflict using interpersonal distances for ethnic and religious attitudes obtained from the World Values Survey. We use the Duclos et al (2004) polar- ization index. We measure conflict by means on an index of...

We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea that the agreement reached in a negotiation is determined by how the direct conflict resulting from disagreement would be resolved. Our basic building block is the disagreement function, which maps each set of feasible...

In this paper we study a behavioral model of conflict that provides a basis for choosing certain indices of dispersion as indicators for conflict. We show that the (equilibrium) level of conflict can be expressed as an (approximate) linear function of the Gini coefficient, the...