We study how preference heterogeneity affects travel behavior and congestion pricing in a dynamic flow congestion model. We formulate and solve a multi-point optimal control problem using a Hamiltonian-based method to derive the social optimum. The properties of the travel equilibrium are...

In most dynamic traffic congestion models, congestion tolls must vary continuously over time to achieve the full optimum. This is also the case in Vickrey's (1969) 'bottleneck model'. To date, the closest approximations of this ideal in practice have so-called 'step tolls', in which the toll...

The recent literature on congestion pricing with large agents contains a remarkable inconsistency: though agents are large enough to recognize self-imposed congestion and exert market power over prices, they do not take into account the impact of their own actions on the magnitude of congestion...

Recent empirical work has suggested that there is an important distinction between short-run versus long-run scheduling behaviour of commuters, reflected in differences in values of time and schedule delays, as well as in preferred arrival moments, for the short-run versus the long-run problem....

This paper considers tradable mobility permit schemes in a monocentric city with a distorting labor tax. Three schemes are analyzed, that differ by the (spatial) allocation of permits to households. Numerical results show that the scheme with permits allocated in proportion to labor supply...

We study how preference heterogeneity affects travel behavior and congestion pricing in a dynamic flow congestion model. We formulate and solve a multi-point optimal control problem using a Hamiltonian-based method to derive the social optimum. The properties of the travel equilibrium are...

Recent empirical work has suggested that there is an important distinction between short-run versus long-run scheduling behaviour of commuters, reflected in differences in values of time and schedule delays, as well as in preferred arrival moments, for the short-run versus the long-run problem....

The recent literature on congestion pricing with large agents contains a remarkable inconsistency: though agents are large enough to recognize self-imposed congestion and exert market power over prices, they do not take into account the impact of their own actions on the magnitude of congestion...