This paper explores the conditions under which compliance with a social contract establishes an equilibrium in a society. It is assumed that society consists of two groups, one of which has a comparative advantage in using violence, whereas the other one has a comparative advantage in producing...

This paper explores conditions under which dictators comply with a social contract. We assume society to consist of two groups, one with a comparative advantage in using violence, the other one with a comparative advantage in producing private goods. Violence can be used to produce security or...

The aim of this paper is to derive conditions under which either dictatorship or the rule of law are the equilibria of a post-constitutional game. It thus contributes to positive constitutional economics, i.e., the research program that is interested in explaining the emergence of constitutions...

This paper explores the conditions under which compliance with a social contract establishes an equilibrium in a society. It is assumed that society consists of two groups, one of which has a comparative advantage in using violence, whereas the other one has a comparative advantage in producing...

Before joining the European Union countries from Central and Eastern Europe have to adopt the acquis communautaire, i.e. the system of legal rules developed in the Union. The paper outlines an economic theory of optimum legal areas, that is used to determine the optimal size of the Union as well...

Before joining the European Union countries from Central and Eastern Europe have to adopt the acquis communautaire, i.e. the system of legal rules developed in the Union. The paper outlines an economic theory of optimum legal areas, that is used to determine the optimal size of the Union as well...