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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001718420
A primary means of bureaucratic oversight is consumer complaints. Yet, this important control mechanism has received very little attention in the literature on corruption. I study a model of corruption with incomplete information in which consumers require a government service from officials who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009764417
I consider a market with two firms, a minority group of customers, and a bigoted (racist, ethnocentric, xenophobic, or sexist) majority group of customers. There exists a Nash equilibrium with full segregation in which a low-price firm serves only the minority and a high-price firm serves only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014284743
A primary means of bureaucratic oversight is consumer complaints. Yet, this important control mechanism has received very little attention in the literature on corruption. I study a model of corruption with incomplete information in which consumers require a government service from officials who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068829
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014427762
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011494844
A primary means of bureaucratic oversight is consumer complaints. Yet, this important control mechanism has received very little attention in the literature on corruption. I study a model of corruption with incomplete information in which consumers require a government service from officials who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315752
I consider a market with two firms, a minority group of customers, and a bigoted (racist, ethnocentric, xenophobic, or sexist) majority group of customers. There exists a Nash equilibrium with full segregation in which a low-price firm serves only the minority and a high-price firm serves only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014348139