We analyze the effects of consumers' limited attention on welfare in a model of horizontal product differentiation. We present a novel approach of modeling limited attention: an attention radius. Each consumer only notices goods that are within her attention radius, i.e., goods that are...

We analyze the effects of consumers' limited attention on welfare in a model of horizontal product differentiation. We present a novel approach of modeling limited attention: an attention radius. Each consumer only notices goods that are within her attention radius, i.e., goods that are...

We study how joint delegation of production and disclosure choices alters the incentives that firm owners offer to their managers. Our first set of results shows how the incentive weights that owners place on revenues are affected by firm characteristics and by whether their manager chooses ex...

We investigate the impact of strategic consumer behavior on retailers' dynamic pricing decisions. We present a stylized two-period model, and test the equilibrium predictions in a set of behavioral experiments in which human subjects played the role of pricing managers. Our main insight is that...

This paper studies the impact of competition on the benefits of advance selling. I construct a two-period price-setting game with heterogeneous consumers and two firms that produce different brands. Some consumers prefer one brand, others prefer the other brand. Consumers derive common value...

We consider a market with two sellers, each having one unit of identical product, who compete for potential buyers with one-unit demand and a private valuation of this product. First, firms simultaneously post their prices. Then buyers observe these prices and choose a seller to submit a request...

We study an extension of the model of Rubinstein (1993) to two firms, competing in a market with consumers who are boundedly rational with respect to processing information. The cognitive bound forces customers to partition the price space. Rubinstein shows that a monopolist is able to earn a...

We propose a dynamic framework for durable-goods with consumers who have different valuations and an arbitrary number of firms which compete in quantities in each period. Consumers' ability to behave strategically about the timing of consumption differs in the three environments that we analyze....

I present a game-theoretic model where economic competition and attention competition are interdependent. On the one hand the effort to attract consumer attention depends on the value of attention to the firm which depends on the grade of price competition among all perceived firms. On the other...