Motivated by tropical deforestation, we analyze (i) a novel theory of resource extraction, (ii) the optimal conservation contract, (iii) when the donor prefers contracting with central rather than local governments, and (iv) how the donor's presence may induce institutional change. Deforestation...

This paper provides a flexible model of resource extraction, such as deforestation, and derives the optimal conservation contract. When property rights are "strong" and districts are in charge of extracting their own resources to get revenues, conservation in one district benefits the others...

While traditional contract theory takes the institutional environment as exogenously given, this paper analyzes how the agents' incentives to (de)centralize authority change when contracts are anticipated. In our model, induced institutional change will always harm the principal, and, under...

The paper presents a dynamic game where players contribute to a public bad, invest in technologies, and write incomplete contracts. Despite the n 1 stocks in the model, the analysis is tractable and the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium unique. If only the contribution levels are...

Motivated by tropical deforestation, we analyze (i) a novel theory of resource extraction, (ii) the optimal conservation contract, (iii) when the donor prefers contracting with central rather than local governments, and (iv) how the donor's presence may induce institutional change. Deforestation...