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Exclusive contracts and protection of investments

Segal, Ilya; Whinston, Michael D. - In: The Rand journal of economics 31 (2000) 4, pp. 603-633

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001557463

Robust predictions for bilateral contracting with externalities

Segal, Ilya; Whinston, Michael D. - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 71 (2003) 3, pp. 757-791

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001769223

The Mirrlees approach to mechanism design with renegotiation (with applications to hold-up and risk sharing)

Segal, Ilya; Whinston, Michael D. - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 70 (2002) 1, pp. 1-45

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001647791

Robust predictions for bilateral contracting with externalities

Segal, Ilya (contributor); Whinston, Michael D. (contributor) - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002189563

Exclusive contracts and protection of investments

Segal, Ilya (contributor); Whinston, Michael D. (contributor) - 2000 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002183419

Structural empirical analysis of contracting in vertical markets

Lee, Robin S.; Whinston, Michael D.; Yurukoglu, Ali - In: Handbook of industrial organization : volume 4, (pp. 673-742). 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013459556

The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-Up and Risk Sharing)

Segal, Ilya; Whinston, Michael D. - 2002

The paper studies the implementation problem, first analyzed by Maskin and Moore (1999), in which two agents observe an unverifiable state of nature and may renegotiate inefficient outcomes following play of the mechanism. We develop a first-order approach to characterizing the set of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014116356