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Contracting with externalities

Segal, Ilya - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000976619

Complexity and renegotiation : a foundation for incomplete contracts

Segal, Ilya - In: The review of economic studies 66 (1999) 1, pp. 57-82

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001408785

Contracting with externalities

Segal, Ilya - In: The quarterly journal of economics 114 (1999) 2, pp. 337-388

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001410479

Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities : divide and conquer?

Segal, Ilya - In: Journal of economic theory 113 (2003) 2, pp. 147-181

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001876000

Exclusive contracts and protection of investments

Segal, Ilya; Whinston, Michael D. - In: The Rand journal of economics 31 (2000) 4, pp. 603-633

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001557463

Robust predictions for bilateral contracting with externalities

Segal, Ilya; Whinston, Michael D. - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 71 (2003) 3, pp. 757-791

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001769223

The Mirrlees approach to mechanism design with renegotiation (with applications to hold-up and risk sharing)

Segal, Ilya; Whinston, Michael D. - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 70 (2002) 1, pp. 1-45

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001647791

Robust predictions for bilateral contracting with externalities

Segal, Ilya (contributor); Whinston, Michael D. (contributor) - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002189563

Exclusive contracts and protection of investments

Segal, Ilya (contributor); Whinston, Michael D. (contributor) - 2000 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002183419

Contracting with Externalities

Segal, Ilya - 1999

The paper studies inefficiencies arising in contracting between one principal and N agents when each agent's utility depends on all agents' trades with the principal. When the principal commits to publicly observed bilateral contracts, the distortion is due to the externalities on agents'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216292