Showing 1 - 10 of 22
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008806103
It is well-known that, in static models, minimum wages generate positive worker rents and, consequently, inefficiently low effort. We show that this result does not necessarily extend to a dynamic context. The reason is that, in repeated employment relationships, firms may exploit workers'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003848905
It is well-known that, in static models, minimum wages generate positive worker rents and, consequently, inefficiently low effort. We show that this result does not necessarily extend to a dynamic context. The reason is that, in repeated employment relationships, firms may exploit workers future...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850666
This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003324054
This article analyzes optimal job design in a repeated principal-agent relationship when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for three tasks whose contribution to firm value is nonverifiable. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. Assigning an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012716255
This paper discusses the strategic role of mismatching, where players voluntarily form inefficient teams or forego the formation of efficient teams, respectively. Strategic mismatching can be rational when players realize a competitive advantage (e.g. harming other competitors). In addition, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001442145
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001719584
The paper analyzes the choice of organizational structure as solution to the trade-off between controlling behavior based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. The analysis includes the owner of a firm, a top manager and two division heads. If it is more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198507
This paper discusses the strategic role of mismatching, where players voluntarily form inefficient teams or forego the formation of efficient teams, respectively. Strategic mismatching can be rational when players realize a competitive advantage (e.g. harming other competitors). In addition, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011313938
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011716711