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Option Contracts and Renegotiation in Complex Environments

Rasmusen, Eric Bennett; Lyon, Thomas P. - 2006

Hart & Moore (1999) construct a model to show that contracts perform poorly when the state of the world is unverifiable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014135183

Contracting over persistent information

Zhao, Wei; Mezzetti, Claudio; Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, … - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012798454

On and Off Contract Remedies Inducing Cooperative Investments

Brooks, Richard R. W.; Stremitzer, Alexander - 2013

this remedial regime allows parties to write simple contracts that induce first-best cooperative investments …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199798

Can Open Contracts Be Profitable?

Fernandez, Jose M. - 2012

This paper provides a theoretical framework in support of recent empirical findings where the use of open contracts in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013103412

Public Contracting in Delegated Agency Games

Martimort, David - 2014

We study games of public delegated common agency under asymmetric information. Using tools from non-smooth analysis and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013058753

Standard breach remedies, quality thresholds, and cooperative investments

Stremitzer, Alexander - 2008

When investments are non-verifiable, inducing cooperative investments with simple contracts may not be as difficult as … some (exogenously given) quality threshold. In order to implement this regime, no more information needs to be verifiable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343923

On and off contract remedies

Brooks, Richard; Stremitzer, Alexander - 2009

this remedial regime allows parties to write simple contracts that induce first-best cooperative investments. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003909321

Contractually stable networks

Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.; Caulier, Jean-François; … - 2009

We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network specifies the nature of the relationship...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008810985

Cross-border intellectual property rights : contract enforcement and absorptive capacity

Naghavi, Alireza; Tsai, Yingyi - 2012

This paper studies cross-border intellectual property rights (IPR) as a North-South contract using a Nash bargaining approach and distinguishes between the outcome and its actual enforcement. The absorptive capacity of the Southern country to exploit technology transfer plays a key role in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011734225

A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement

Martimort, David - 2015

We present a Theory of Contracts under costly enforcement in the context of a dynamic relationship between an … constraints ensuring that trading partners do not breach contracts unduly. Whether a long-term contract is enforceable does not … depend on the distribution of penalties for breach between the buyer and the seller. While under complete information, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013034181