We consider an in nitely repeated reappointment game in a principal- agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government- public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of...

This paper considers the "DeFi intermediation chain"--the market structure that underlies the creation and distribution of ETH, the native cryptocurrency of Ethereum--to examine how information asymmetry shapes intermediation rents. We argue that using proof-of-stake blockchain technology in...

We consider an infinitely repeated reappointment game in a principal-agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government-public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of...

We discuss contract theory from a combined Austrian/new institutional view. In the latter view, the world is seen as shot through with ignorance and transaction costs, but, as a tendency, entrepreneurial activity responds to the problems caused by these. All modeling must critically reflect...

In this paper it is demonstrated that voluntary bargaining over a collective decision under asymmetric information may well lead to ex post efficiency if the default decision is non-trivial. It is argued that the default decision may be interpreted as a 'simple' contract that the parties have...

A common pattern of control in firms is for management to retain a broad set of rights, while the remaining stakeholders’ contracts provide them with targeted veto rights over specific classes of decisions. We explain this pattern of control sharing as an efficient organizational response that...

Starting from the Contribution from Ronald Coase, the modern theoretical literature tends to identify the firm with the hierarchic coordination of the workforce, opposed to the coordination of the production factors operated by the market. Other authors prefer to concentrate on the entrepreneur...

This entry discusses alternative theories of contract choice and design with special emphasis on (i) the interaction between contract design and contract enforcement and (ii) the explanatory power of alternative theories. After discussing the primary functions of contract, the entry reviews the...

This entry discusses alternative theories of contract choice and design with special emphasis on (i) the interaction between contract design and contract enforcement and (ii) the explanatory power of alternative theories. After discussing the primary functions of contract, the entry reviews the...

We argue that a contract provides a reference point for a trading relationship: more precisely, for parties' feelings of entitlement. A party's ex post performance depends on whether he gets what he is entitled to relative to outcomes permitted by the contract. A party who is shortchanged shades...