We consider a single-principal/multi-agent model to investigate the principal's preferences over delegated contracting. The analysis extends the single-agent/multi-task LEN model in Feltham and Xie (1994) to a multi-agent/multi-task context. We consider full-commitment contracts, i.e., the...

The present study began with Jerry Feltham’s invitation to present at the Stanford Summer Camp in August 2003. As we were variously involved in related work on performance measurement and dynamic incentives, Peter, Jerry, Christian, and Florin teamed up and the result was Christensen, Feltham,...

This paper analyzes the impact of signal-to-noise-ratios and the autocorrelation of a performance measure on the principal's welfare in dynamic agencies with renegotiation. We consider the impact of changes in the persistent, transitory, and reversible components of accounting earnings on its...

We study theoretically and empirically the relation between altruism preferences and incentive contract design. Theoretically, we extend Fischer and Huddart (2008) to investigate how social norms reinforce altruism preferences, thus affecting the optimal contract design related to incentive...