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This paper considers the efficiency of a contestable natural monopoly if consumers are heterogeneous and the monopolist can differentiate prices imperfectly. With restricted entry, the standard result in this case is that the monopoly offers a menu of price-quantity combinations which leads to...
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This paper presents an overview of the economics of international aid, highlighting the historical literature and the contemporary debates. It reviews the “trade-theoretic” and the “contract-theoretic” analytical literature, and the empirical and institutional literature. It demonstrates...
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We study a principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection. Risk-neutral agents with limited liability have arbitrary private information about the distribution of outputs and the cost of effort. We show that under a multiplicative separability condition, the optimal mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013327130
Judges become ambitious decision makers when they face appellate review. This paper applies a contract theoretic perspective to the behavior of self-interested trial judges in a twolevel court system and analyzes the consequences for contracting in “the shadow of” the court. Confronted with...
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This dissertation investigates capital market frictions across three themes. The first theme is sovereign debt. Recent experience in the EU shows that it can be complex to enforce the repayment promises of states. Furthermore, governments are better informed about their repayment capacity than...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010196660
We study contracting and costly renegotiation in settings of complete, but unverifiable information, using the mechanism-design approach. We show how renegotiation activity is best modeled in the fundamentals of the mechanism-design framework, so that noncontractibility of renegotiation amounts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009785372