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In an agency model with adverse selection, we study how hidden interactions between agents affect the optimal contract. The principal employs two agents who learn their task environments through their involvement. The principal cannot observe the task environments. It is important to note that...
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Regulators and the firms they regulate interact repeatedly. Over the course of these interactions, the regulator collects data that contains information about the firm's id- iosyncratic private characteristics. This paper studies the case in which the regulator uses information gleaned from past...
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In this paper the impact of noise on dynamic adverse selection in principal-agent relationships is examined. Significant deviations in terms of equilibrium actions and payments occur, when compared to deterministic environments. Information dissipates slowly, so payments to agents who stand to...
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The dynamics of a stochastic, two-period principal-agent relationship is studied. The agent's type remains the same over time. Contracts are short term. The principal designs the second contract, taking the information available about the agent after the first period into account. Compared to...
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The impact of information dissemination and experimentation on dynamic adverse selection in noisy agency relationships is examined. Significant deviations in terms of equilibrium actions and payments occur, when compared to deterministic environments. Information dissipates slowly, so payments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014075801