This paper considers games in which multiple principals contract simultaneously with the same agent. We introduce a new class of revelation mechanisms that, although it does not always permit a complete equilibrium characterization, it facilitates the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes...

This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with direct exter-nalities between principals both under complete and asymmetric information. Direct externalities arise when the contracting variable of one principal affects directly the other principal s payoff....

This paper investigates the existence and nature of equilibrium in a competitive insurance market under adverse selection with endogenously determined information structures. Rothschild-Stiglitz (RS) characterized the self-selection equilibrium under the assumption of exclusivity, enforcement of...

We establish the existence of sequential equilibria in general menu games, known to be suffcient to analyze common agency problems. In particular, we show that our result solves some unpleasant features of early approaches

This paper considers games in which multiple principals contract simultaneously and noncooperatively with the same agent. We introduce a new class of revelation mechanisms which, although they do not always permit a complete equilibrium characterization, do facilitate the characterization of the...

But when the information structure itself is endogenous - firms and consumers decide what information about insurance purchases to reveal to whom - there always exists a Nash equilibrium. Strategies for firms consist of insurance contracts to offer and information-revelation strategies; for...