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This paper discusses two variations to the optimal lending contract under asymmetric information studied in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006). One variation assumes that the entrepreneur is less patient than the bank, and the other assumes the bank has limited commitment.The qualitative properties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061267
Economic models routinely assume firms maximize shareholder wealth; however common law legal systems only require that officers and directors pursue the interests of the corporation, leaving this ill-defined. Economic arguments for shareholder wealth maximization derived from shareholders'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023372
We exploit an influential 1991 Delaware court ruling to examine simultaneously two types of conservatism that play important roles in resolving creditor-owner agency conflicts: contracting conservatism and reporting conservatism. The ruling expanded managerial fiduciary duties in favor of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012835513
We exploit an influential 1991 Delaware court ruling to examine simultaneously two types of conservatism that play important roles in resolving creditor-owner agency conflicts: contracting conservatism and reporting conservatism. The ruling expanded managerial fiduciary duties in favor of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012856823
We analyse the effect of equity-based incentives in a supply chain with a downstream firm and an upstream supplier. By using the operational decision as a signal to influence external investors’ beliefs, the downstream firm’s manager intends to maximize a convex combination of the interim...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014045006
In this chapter we study dynamic incentive models in which risk sharing is endogenously limited by the presence of informational or enforcement frictions. We comprehensively overview one of the most important tools for the analysis such problems—the theory of recursive contracts. Recursive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024287
I study the optimal audit mechanism when the principal cannot commit to an audit strategy. Invoking a relevation principle, the agent reports her type to a mediator whi assigns contracts and recommends the principla whether to audit. For each reported type the mediator randomizes over a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285322
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