Similar Search Results

Dynamic contracts when agent's quality is unknown

Prat, Julien; Jovanovic, Boyan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 865-914

We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674079

Audit contracts and reputation

Portilla, Yolanda - Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - 2009

management and the audit effort are decreasing over time because the incentives to build a reputation also decline for both …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005196631

Contract Litigation as Information Revelation Channel and its Implications on Reputation (Dis)Incentives

Tzang, F.L. Philip - 2011

We examine how the reputation concern of contracting parties affects contractual incentives if information is … revealed to future buyers only if contractual disputes are litigated. We show that the seller's reputation concern acts like an … additional legal cost which induces her to settle privately. A strong reputation concern effectively voids the incentive contract …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125615

Random inspections and periodic reviews : optimal dynamic monitoring

Varas, Felipe; Marinovic, Iván; Skrzypacz, Andrzej - 2018

reputation for quality, and a principal (e.g. a regulator) can learn the agent's quality via costly inspections. Monitoring plays … two roles: an incentive role, because outcomes of inspections affect agent's reputation, and an informational role because …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865082

(Bad) reputation in relational contracting

Deb, Rahul; Mitchell, Matthew F.; Pai, Mallesh M. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 2, pp. 763-800

Motivated by markets for ''expertise,'' we study a bandit model where a principal chooses between a safe and risky arm. A strategic agent controls the risky arm and privately knows whether its type is high or low. Irrespective of type, the agent wants to maximize duration of experimentation with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273779

Effects of the menu of loan contracts on borrower behavior

Abraham, Katharine G.; Filiz-Ozbay, Emel; Ozbay, Erkut Y.; … - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 68 (2022) 1, pp. 509-528

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012821211

Testing for adverse selection into private medical insurance

Olivella, Pau; Vera-Hernandez, Marcos - 2006

We develop a test for adverse selection and use it to examine private health insurance markets. In contrast to earlier papers that consider a purely private system or a system in which private insurance supplements a public system, we focus our attention on a system where privately funded health...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292988

Optimal dynamic contracting: The first-order approach and beyond

Battaglini, Marco; Lamba, Rohit - In: Theoretical Economics 14 (2019) 4, pp. 1435-1482

We explore the conditions under which the "first-order approach" (FO-approach) can be used to characterize profit maximizing contracts in dynamic principal-agent models. The FO-approach works when the resulting FO-optimal contract satisfies a particularly strong form of monotonicity in types, a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215290

Gouvernance optimale moderne des universités

Jellal, Mohamed - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

This paper is a theoretical introduction to modern governance of universities in developing countries. Indeed, adopting the approach of the paradigm of the theory of incentives Laffont and Tirole (1993), this paper discusses the effects of the presence of information asymmetry between the State...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108454

Contract theory and implications for perennial energy crop contracting

Alexander, Corinne; Ivanic, Rasto; Rosch, Stephanie; … - In: Energy Economics 34 (2012) 4, pp. 970-979

This article provides an overview of modern contract theory and discusses the implications of the theory for contracting for perennial dedicated energy crops. We discuss some of the unique challenges of contracting for dedicated energy crops used for the production of advanced biofuels and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011039595