This paper develops a model of relational contracting to help explain the prevalence of multiunit franchising; a phenomenon not fully understood in the literature. The model is used to derive a key prediction, which is that franchise systems with a greater propensity to engage in multiunit...

A key strategic decision for many firms is the breadth of their relationships with partners. Existing theories of relationship scope are limited in that they disregard two key aspects of interfirm networks: (1) that most firms transact within networks of multiple partners, and (2) that these...

We suggest and provide empirical evidence that the bargaining power of alliance partners stemming from their prominence in alliance networks influences the ex-ante allocation of value capturing rights in high-tech alliance contracts. Network prominence can enhance the availability of alternative...

When there are constantly new, valuable opportunities to transact with alternative partners a situation we refer to as exchange value uncertainty long-term or committed transactions among the same individuals are discouraged. But when opportunism creates exchange hazards, which escalate in...

While some argue that incomplete incentive contracts facilitate the self-enforcement of informal dealings, other authors submit that they substitute for or 'crowd out' social norms supporting informal arrangements. We use experimental evidence to test these theories by manipulating the extent to...