An agency model of contracts used in California's processing‐tomato industry is estimated in three stages. We first estimate growers' stochastic production possibilities, and then, for a given vector of preference parameters, compute an optimal compensation schedule. Finally, we compare...

Agricultural cooperatives have long played an important role in helping their members manage risk. Yet the typical cooperative does a much better job of helping their members manage some sorts of risk than it does others. In particular, co-ops are good at helping members manage marketing risk,...

In this paper we focus on mechanisms of coordination in agricultural contracts. Our approach is intended to advance understanding of social relations of production and distribution of power in agrofood systems. Through an analysis of contracts between farmers and intermediaries (e.g.,...

It is a commonplace observation that risk-averse farmers ought to prefer less risk. In this paper, we provide three qualifications to this commonplace. First, we note that (properly defined) “less risk” need not imply “smaller variance.” Second, we note that when farmers produce under...