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Typical contracts assign both coercive and non-coercive means of power to the principal's side, providing the agent with a comparably small range of countervailing anti-power. Initially agents are therefore vulnerable to opportunistic principal behavior and will rationally anticipate this threat...
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This article analyzes optimal job design in a repeated principal-agent relationship when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for three tasks whose contribution to firm value is nonverifiable. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. Assigning an...
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We study the relationship between outside options and workers' motivation to exert effort. We evaluate changes in outside options arising from age and experience cutoffs in the Austrian unemployment insurance (UI) system, and use absenteeism as a proxy for worker effort. Results indicate that a...
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We study the relationship between outside options and workers' motivation to exert effort. We evaluate changes in outside options arising from age and experience cutoffs in the Austrian unemployment insurance (UI) system, and use absenteeism as a proxy for worker effort. Results indicate that a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014320100
Starting from the Contribution from Ronald Coase, the modern theoretical literature tends to identify the firm with the hierarchic coordination of the workforce, opposed to the coordination of the production factors operated by the market. Other authors prefer to concentrate on the entrepreneur...
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