Sweden offers a unique natural experiment to analyze the microeconomic effects of institutionalized saving on ownership structure, corporate governance and performance of listed companies. First, the Swedish pension reform increased the participation of pension funds in the domestic stock market...

Purpose The purpose of this study is to develop a new measure for discriminatory related party transactions (DRPTs). There are currently measures for such discriminatory transactions but the new measure has a strong theoretical basis and is less susceptible to measurement error....

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the incentives of controlling shareholders in the market for corporate control. The author investigates the takeover premiums paid by a sample of European acquiring firms with voting rights structures that are highly concentrated. The results...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the incentives of controlling shareholders in the market for corporate control. The author investigates the takeover premiums paid by a sample of European acquiring firms with voting rights structures that are highly concentrated. The results...

Debt is not frequently analyzed in relation to the conflict between controlling and outside shareholders. At the same time, debt helps to manage the type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of...

Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998–2009 is empirically tested. It supports...

Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998–2009 is empirically tested. It supports...

This paper examines the incentives of controlling shareholders in the market for corporate control. We investigate the takeover premiums paid by a sample of European acquiring firms with concentrated voting rights structures. The results show a positive relationship between takeover premiums and...