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We give an explicit PDE characterization for the solution of the problem of maximizing the utility of both terminal wealth and intertemporal consumption under model uncertainty. The underlying market model consists of a risky asset, whose volatility and long-term trend are driven by an external...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999855
<Para ID="Par1">This paper studies the problem of maximizing expected utility from terminal wealth in a semi-static market composed of derivative securities, which we assume can be traded only at time zero, and of stocks, which can be traded continuously in time and are modelled as locally bounded...</para>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011151669
<Para ID="Par1">We consider the terminal wealth utility maximization problem from the point of view of a portfolio manager who is paid by an incentive scheme, which is given as a convex function g of the terminal wealth. The manager’s own utility function U is assumed to be smooth and strictly concave;...</para>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010997076
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In incomplete financial markets, not every contingent claim can be perfectly replicated by a self-financing strategy. In this paper, we minimize the risk that the value of the hedging portfolio falls below the payoff of the claim at time T. We use a coherent risk measure, introduced by Artzner...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005279129
We are given a list of tasks Z and a population divided into several groups X j of equal size. Performing one task z requires constituting a team with exactly one member x j from every group. There is a cost (or reward) for participation: if type x j chooses task z, he receives p j (z);...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009195331
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008925432
We are given a list of tasks Z and a population divided into several groups X j of equal size. Performing one task z requires constituting a team with exactly one member x j from every group. There is a cost (or reward) for participation: if type x j chooses task z, he receives p j (z);...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706644