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Development of human societies requires cooperation among unrelated individuals and obedience to social norms. Although punishment is widely agreed to be potentially useful in fostering cooperation, many recent results in psychology and economics highlight punishments' failures in this regard....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003278956
Development of human societies requires cooperation among unrelated individuals and obedience to social norms. Although punishment is widely agreed to be potentially useful in fostering cooperation, many recent results in psychology and economics highlight punishments' failures in this regard....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012780905
Does transparent leadership promote cooperative groups? We address this issue using a public goods experiment with exogenously selected leaders who are able to send non-binding contribution suggestions to the group. To investigate the effect of transparency in this setting we vary the ease with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261614
We report data from public goods games showing that privately-implemented punishment reduces cooperation in relation to a baseline treatment without punishment. When that same incentive is implemented publicly, however, cooperation is sustained at significantly higher rates than in either the...
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This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is independent of its proposer. In a prisoner's dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, cooperation is lower when the enforcement of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013092277
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In a prisoner’s dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, both the cooperation rate and the earnings are lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594214