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Encouraging cooperation in sharing supermodular costs
Schulz, Andreas S.; Uhan, Nelson A. - 2007 - Rev.
The least core value of a cooperative game is the minimum penalty we need to charge a coalition for defecting that ensures the existence of a fair and efficient cost allocation. The set of all such cost allocations is called the least core. In this paper, we study the computational complexity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003948685
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The complexity of egalitarian mechanisms for linear programming games
Uhan, Nelson A. - In: Operations research letters 42 (2014) 1, pp. 76-81
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010259239
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Stochastic linear programming games with concave preferences
Uhan, Nelson A. - In: European journal of operational research : EJOR 243 (2015) 2, pp. 637-646
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010510000
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Dynamic cost allocation for economic lot sizing games
Toriello, Alejandro; Uhan, Nelson A. - In: Operations research letters 42 (2014) 1, pp. 82-84
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010259234
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Computing payoff allocations in the approximate core of linear programming games in a privacy-preserving manner
Gilliam, George; Uhan, Nelson A. - In: Operations research letters 50 (2022) 1, pp. 64-71
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013177166