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The stable roommates problem with payments has as input a graph G(E,V) with an edge weighting w:E→R+ and the problem is to find a stable solution. A solution is a matching M with a vector pϵRV that satisfies 􂀀pu+pv=w(uv) for all uvϵM and pu=0 for all u unmatched in M. A solution is stable...
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We generalize two well-known game-theoretic models by introducing multiple partners matching games, defined by a graph G = (N;E), with an integer vertex capacity function b and an edge weighting w. The set N consists of a number of players that are to form a set M is a subset of E of 2-player...
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In this paper we investigate some new applications of Scarf's Lemma. First, we introduce the notion of fractional core for NTU-games, which is always nonempty by the Lemma. Stable allocation is a general solution concept for games where both the players and their possible cooperations can have...
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Let N = {1,..., n} be a finite set of players and KN the complete graph on the node set N "union" {0}. Assume that the edges of KN have nonnegative weights and associate with each coalition S "subset of" N of players as cost c(S) the weight of a minimal spanning tree on the node set S "union"...
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