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Conditional cooperation : behavioral regularities from the lab and the field and their policy implications

Gächter, Simon (contributor) - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003321822

Conditional cooperation : behavioral regularities from the lab and the field and their policy implications

Gächter, Simon - In: Economics and psychology : a promising new …, (pp. 19 - 50). 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014558186

Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments

Fehr, Ernst; Gächter, Simon - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001403870

Are people conditionally cooperative? : Evidende from a public goods experiment

Fischbacher, Urs; Gächter, Simon; Fehr, Ernst - In: Economics letters 71 (2001) 3, pp. 397-404

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001574285

Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments

Fehr, Ernst; Gächter, Simon - In: The American economic review 90 (2000) 4, pp. 980-994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001521155

Fairness in the labour market : a survey of experimental results

Gächter, Simon; Fehr, Ernst - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001745487

Fairness in the labour market : a survey of experimental results

Gächter, Simon; Fehr, Ernst - In: Surveys in experimental economics : bargaining, …, (pp. 95-132). 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001681110

Reziprozität und Ökonomie : Implikationen des reziproken Verhaltens für den Arbeitsmarkt

Fehr, Ernst; Gächter, Simon - In: Europäische Arbeitsmärkte und Arbeitsmarkttheorie : …, (pp. 57-75). 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001657660

Trust, voluntary cooperation, and socio-economic background: survey and experimental evidence

Gächter, Simon; Herrmann, Benedikt; Thöni, Christian - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 55 (2004) 4, pp. 505-531

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002399310

Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments

Fehr, Ernst; Gächter, Simon - 2001

This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. The more free riders negatively deviate from the group standard the more they are punished. As a consequence, the existence of an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014160643