This note studies contests in which multiple participants compete for two distinct prizes. The participants have distinct constant marginal costs, which are commonly known. We show that the contests have a unique Nash equilibrium, and we characterize the equilibrium payoffs and strategies in...

A situation in which a finite set of players can generate certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility. A solution for TU-games assigns to every TU-game a distribution of the payoffs that can be earned over the individual players. Two well-known...

Isaac and Walker (1985) demonstrated that stable cooperative agreements are often formed in sealed bid auctions. By extending the experimental environment to multiple, simultaneous sealed bid auctions, it is possible to not only examine whether bidders collude in experimental auctions, but also...

Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...

A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions (possibly empty or consisting of a unique element) to every...

We consider a market situation with two corners. One corner consists of a single seller with one object, and the other corner consists of potential buyers who all want the object. We suppose that the valuations of the object for the different buyers is known by all of them. Then two cooperative...