We introduce the Maschler-Perles-Shapley value for NTU games composed by smooth bodies. This waywe extend the M-P-S value established for games composed by Cephoids ("sums of deGua Simplices"). The development is parallel to the one of the (generalized) Maschler-Perles bargaining solution. For...

The Taxation Game is a cooperative game played between a set of countries I = {1, . . . , n} admitting the operation of a multinational enterprise (MNE, "the firm" ) within their jurisdiction. The firm, when operating within the territory of a subgroup S ⊆ I of countries (a coalition) will...

We consider (cooperative) linear production games with a continuum of players. The coalitional function is generated by r 1 “production factors” that is, non atomic measures defined on an interval. r of these are orthogonal probabilities which, economically, can be considered as...